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INTRODUCTION

National and international regulatory policies that address major
environmental issues have become inseparable.' Governments, including the
United States, must respond to international issues regarding health, safety,
and the environment.2 Political and legal maneuvers cannot eliminate
current environmental problems.' United States environmental laws address
many issues, including pollution, conservation, energy, soil, mining,
threatened and endangered species, nonindigenous species (NIS), and the
"quality of life in a world where states and people move and trade." 4 As a
result, numerous problems can arise from gaps in national and international
systems for protection of the environment.' United States environmental
laws also affect international trade in a variety of ways. For instance, U.S.
environmental laws prohibit the use of certain raw materials and substances,
restrict international trade of exotic and endangered species, institute a
licensing and permitting system, and charge polluters for damaging the
environment.
However, several loopholes in environmental laws and regulations exist
at all levels of federal and state governments.7 Federal and state laws,
regulations, and programs do not address the introduction of certain types of
NIS. 8 In many instances, introduction of NIS is harmful. 9 Some of these
loopholes may be closed by stricter implementation and enforcement by
federal and state agencies, while others can only be closed by legislative
action.'0 Florida has become cognizant of the increasing ecological, human
health, and economic consequences associated with NIS and the need for
more stringent environmental oversight." While relatively few NIS have
been identified as causing severe economic consequences in Florida, the
effects of introducing and managing harmful NIS in Florida outweigh any
economic benefits derived from nonharmful NIS. Harmful NIS have caused

1. NORMAN J. VIG & MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S, at

316 (3rd ed. 1990).
2. Id.
3. Id.at 317.
4. Michel Prieur, Environmental Regulations and Foreign Trade Aspects, 3 FLA. INT'L
L.J. 85, 85 (1987).

5. Id.
6. id.
7. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Harmful Non-Indigenous Species
in the United States, OTA-F-565, 45 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Sept.
1993) [hereinafter OTA Report].
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 264-66.
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extensive losses of revenue, imposed extensive costs for their control and
eradication, posed threats to human health, and caused the loss of some of
Florida's natural areas and resources.
Part II of this note looks at the consequences associated with the
introduction of injurious NIS. Part III examines the legal background of, and
the authority for, the proposed Florida NIS statute in terms of its
constitutionality and as legislation in aid of the Florida Game and Freshwater
Fish Commission (FGFFC) and the citizens suit enforcement provision of the
statute. Part IV discusses the impact of the proposed NIS statute on interstate
commerce in terms of the doctrine of nondiscrimination, state economic
protectionism, and the market-participant doctrine, as applied to the
introduction and management of exotic species in Florida. Part V focuses on
the impact of the proposed NIS statute on international trade in exotic
12
species. Part VI scrutinizes the scope and limitations of the Lacey Act.
Part VII examines the jurisdictional expansion of the Lacey Act to apply
extraterritorially in light of the effects test, the international law principle of
sovereign jurisdiction, and the marriage of the Lacey Act to international
treaties. Finally, part VIII proposes the amendment of the Lacey Act to
incorporate the approach used in the proposed NIS statute.
Courts should find that the proposed NIS statute passes constitutional
muster both at the federal and state level. The Florida legislature also should
find the proposed statute constitutional for adoption by the FGFFC, as
legislation in aid of the commission. Similarly, the U.S. Congress should
amend the Lacey Act to include the proposed NIS statute's three-part listing
approach.
II.

CONSEQUENCES OF INTRODUCING INJURIOUS
NONINDIGENOUS SPECIES

The U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) defines
nonindigenous as "[t]he condition of a species being beyond its natural range
or natural zone of potential dispersal; includ[ing] all domesticated and feral
species and all hybrids except for naturally occurring crosses between
indigenous species."' 3 Approximately sixty-three percent of all imported
nonindigenous bird species in the continental United States are found in
Florida."4 The state also provides habitat for more nonindigenous amphibi-

12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1994).
13. OTA Report, supra note 7, at 53 Box 2-A. Feral is defined as "free-living plants or
animals, living under natural selection pressures, descended from domesticated ancestors."
Id. Natural range is "[t]he geographic area [that] a species inhabits or would inhabit in the
absence of significant human influence." Id.
14. Id. at 255.
In addition, South Florida is infested with several aggressive
nonindigenous plants, most of which were deliberately introduced into the state. Id.
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an and reptile species than any other state. 5 Severe ecological, economic,
and resource management problems have resulted from the introduction of
harmful NIS into Florida. 6 NIS have negatively impacted fishing,7 water
sports, wildlife habitat, biological diversity, and natural ecosystems.
IUl.

LEGAL BACKGROUND AND AUTHORITY

A.

Constitutionality

The State of Florida is well recognized as providing the largest sanctuary
for NIS.18 The problems caused by NIS in Florida are among the most
severe in the United States.' 9 Several factors are at the root of the NIS
problem in Florida, including "the subtropical climate, major ports of entry,
burgeoning pet, aquarium and ornamental plant industries; high rates of
human immigration, increasing urbanization, and extensive environmental
manipulation."20 Therefore, limiting the incidence of harmful NIS in
Florida is a compelling state interest. The proposed NIS statute is designed
not only to maintain the economic and educational value of Florida's use of
NIS, but also to minimize current and future negative biological and social
costs due to the importation, use, and release of harmful NIS into the state.
In the 1981 Lacey Act Amendments, Congress extended protection to
wildlife and plants not covered by the Lacey Act and encouraged states and
foreign governments to protect a broad variety of species. 2 Although not
"unmistakably clear," Congress did not intend the 1981 Lacey Act
Amendments to alter the level of commerce clause scrutiny applied to stateenacted laws.22 The question turns on whether the burden imposed on
interstate commerce by a Florida restriction on the importation of NIS into
the state would be constitutionally permissible under the general rule
governing other types of commerce.23 Under the general rule enunciated in
Hughes v. Oklahoma,24 courts will only validate the challenged state law if

15. Id. "South Florida contains one of the largest complexes of preserved ecosystems in
the eastern United States, totaling about 3500 square miles: Everglades National Park, Big
Cypress National Preserve, Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, and Fakahatchee Strand
Preserve .
I..."
Id.
16. Id. at 255, 257.
17. Id. at 257. Introduction means "[a]ll or part of the process by which a nonindigenous
species is imported to a new locale and is released or escapes into a free-living state." Id. at
53.
18. Id. at 254-55.
19. Id. at 254.
20. Id. at 255.
21. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986).
22. Id.
23. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 336 (1979).
24. Id.
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they determine that the law regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental"
effects on interstate commerce.25 Where a state law discriminates against
interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect, the state carries
the burden of demonstrating that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose
and this purpose can not be served equally by any other alternative
nondiscriminatory means.26 Philadelphia v. New Jersey illustrates this
general rule.27
Drawing an analogy between Congress power to regulate the interstate
movement of out-of-state wastes and the power granted to the states by the
U.S. Constitution, the PhiladelphiaCourt made it clear that states are not free
from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict the movement of out-of-state
wastes.28 Where the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits, courts will find the statute
unconstitutional.2 9 If courts find that a legitimate local purpose exists, the
question then becomes one of degree.3" The tolerable extent of the burden
will depend on the nature of the local interest involved and whether that
interest could be equally promoted with lesser impact on interstate com31
merce.
A state is not empowered to prevent trading of privately-owned goods in
interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local
demands or because they are needed by the people of the state.32 In
Philadelphia, the New Jersey Waste Control Act of 197 333 fell squarely
within the area of the commerce clause prohibition on state regulations.3 4
On its face, the Act imposed the full burden of conserving New Jersey's
remaining landfill space on out-of-state commercial interests.3 5 The crucial
issue arising out of Philadelphiawas the attempt by one state to isolate itself
from a national problem by restricting the movement of interstate trade in
violation of the commerce clause.36
Since out-of-state solid wastes posed no greater danger to the state than
solid waste generated in-state, the Court found that a health-based ban on
out-of-state solid wastes was not a compelling state interest in need of

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Id. at 622-23.
Id. at 624.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id. at 628.
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governmental protection.3 7 Because of the increased danger that results
from the introduction of injurious NIS, courts should find that protecting
Florida's indigenous populations against the release of harmful NIS is a
compelling state interest. Also, the courts should find that Florida's proposed
statute is a nondiscriminatory alternative and the least intrusive means of accomplishing the state's objective because the proposed NIS statute does not
place a ban on all NIS. The statute should pass state constitutional muster
as legislation in aid of the FGFFC.
B.

Legislation in Aid of the Florida Game and
FreshwaterFish Commission

The Florida legislature recognizes the FGFFC as an agency specifically
provided for and authorized by the state constitution.3 8 Under the
constitution, with the exception of license fees, the FGFFC has regulatory
and executive authority over wild animals and fresh water aquatic life.39
License fees for the taking of wild animal and fresh water aquatic life,
including penalties imposed for violating the commission's regulation, must
be prescribed by specific statutes.40 The Florida Constitution grants rights
and privileges to the FGFFC equal to those of departments established under
the organizational structure of the executive branch,4 while preserving the
FGFFC's constitutional designation and title as a commission.42 Unlike the
FGFFC, departments established by the executive branch of the government
are subject to "the direct supervision of the governor, the lieutenant governor,
the governor and cabinet, a cabinet member, or an43officer or board appointed
by and serving at the pleasure of the governor.,
The Florida Legislature may enact laws in aid of the FGFFC, that are
44
consistent with the constitutional mandate of the commission.
Constitutionally, the legislature may pass laws affecting the FGFFC's
exercise of its executive budgetary authority, but may not legally pass laws
depriving the commission of such authority. 45 Consistent with this
constitutional provision, the legislature should present the proposed NIS
statute for adoption by the FGFFC, promulgating the rules and regulations

37. Id. (New Jersey viewed chapter 363 of the Waste Water Control Act as a healthprotective measure, reducing the exposure of its residents to the harmful effects of landfill
sites.).
38. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (amended 1995); see also FLA. STAT. § 20.325 (1993).
39. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 9.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
FLA. STAT. ch. 20 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
Id. § 20.325.
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
Id. § 9.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss1/7

6

Baruch: The Proposed Florida Nonindigenous Species Statute: A Salvation f
1995]

PROPOSED FLORIDA NIS STATUTE

necessary to carry out the intent, purpose, and guidelines of the statute.
The proposed NIS statute authorizes the enactment of a comprehensive
assessment program of potential NIS prior to their arrival in Florida and a
licensing and permitting program to certify and monitor the use of these
species.46 It also provides an appropriate means for public and interagency
review of potential NIS certifications. 47 The proposed NIS statute further
provides for enforcement of existing federal, state, and local environmental
regulations, enhancing the state's regulatory program and promoting efficient
use of available state resources.4
Utilizing existing federal and state policies, the proposed NIS statute
authorizes the formation of a new and comprehensive set of rules and
regulations, supplementing existing Florida NIS rules and regulations
administered by the FGFFC. Its purpose is, therefore, consistent with the
commission's constitutional mandate. 49 Absent a constitutional amendment
subjecting the FGFFC to the administration of the executive branch, it should
be presented to the commission for adoption under Article IV, section 9, as
legislation in aid of the commission. 0
C.

Citizens Suit Enforcement

Unlike the Lacey Act,5 section 372.40 of the proposed Florida NIS
statute gives citizens standing 2 to bring private actions against violators of
the statute. Currently, a party whose substantial interest may be adversely
affected by FGFFC's final decision to issue or deny a NIS license or permit
must exhaust the available remedies under the Florida Administrative
Procedure Act prior to seeking judicial review.53 Allowing private actions
brought for civil damages would better serve the public policy underlying the
statute, that is, the protection of indigenous species from the release of
harmful NIS into Florida. 4
Several recent federal court decisions have established that three elements
must be met to obtain standing. 5 First, plaintiff must have suffered an
"injury in fact," an invasion of a legally-protected interest that is concrete

46. See infra app. §§ 372.36-.37.
47. See id. § 372.34.
48. See id. § 372.32.
49. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
50. Id.
51. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988).
52. See infra app. § 372.40. This citizens standing provision addresses the issue of
causation and does not necessarily provide citizens with the constitutional minimum
requirement to establish standing. Id.
53. See infra app. § 372.39(4); see also FLA. ADM. ACT, ch. 120.68 (1993).
54. See infra app. § 372.30.
55. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
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and particularized and "actual or imminent."56 Second, plaintiff must
establish a nexus, which is a causal connection between the injury and the
alleged conduct." The injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant and not have resulted from the independent action of
some third party not named in the action.5" Third, plaintiff must show that
it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision by the
court.5 9

The U.S. Supreme Court has come to recognize that changes to the
environment that result in an injury may confer standing upon an individual.60 Often times, courts must address the issue of whether an
organization, claiming an interest in an existing problem, has standing to
bring the action.6
The rule is settled that the party invoking federal
jurisdiction must bear the burden of establishing standing and show that the
claimant has suffered an injury in fact.62 Courts have consistently held that
a plaintiff, raising only hypothetical injury that is unconnected with a
threatened concrete personal interest, does not satisfy the constitutional
minimum requirements of standing. 63 However, if the Lacey Act and its
enforcement mechanism were modified to allow private parties to initiate
actions, they would have standing by alleging an injury to their recreation,
conservation activities, or aesthetic pleasure. 64 Further, private parties who
observe others engaged in the illegal taking of wildlife in countries other than
the United States also could have standing to sue. 65 However, courts most
likely would reject this argument, holding that the concerned parties are
seeking to establish standing on special interest grounds.6 6
Allowing private enforcement would reduce the burden currently on
government agencies.67 Further, such a provision could provide for fee
shifting, which would allow private parties to pursue claims without being
forced to bear the cost of litigation. 68 One author has suggested that the

56. Id. at 560.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 561.
60. Julia C. Shepard, Comment, The Lacey Act: Extraterritorial Application Based on an
Antitrust Paradigm, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 67, 90 (1992).
61. Id.; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 556 (However, the Court noted that the Defenders of
Wildlife had stated "purely speculative, nonconcrete injuries when they argued that suit can
be brought by anyone with an interest in studying or seeing endangered animals anywhere on
the globe and anyone with a professional interest in such animals.").
62. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
63. Id. at 556
64. Shepard, supra note 60, at 91.
65. Id.
66. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
67. Shepard, supra note 60, at 91.
68. Id.
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private enforcement mechanism should require citizens to notify the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS), U.S. Customs Service, and any state agency that
enforces fish and wildlife regulations of an alleged violation before bringing
an action against a violator.69 Thus, agencies could "determine whether the
agency or the citizen should enforce the Lacey Act and its penalty provisions
against alleged violators."7 By incorporating a private attorney-general
enforcement provision in the Lacey Act, either the federal agencies or
affected citizens could act on violations adversely affecting a species. Absent
such a federal statutory provision, private citizens could acquire a derivative
right under the proposed NIS statute to enforce the Lacy Act.
IV. IMPACT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE
A.

The Doctrine of Nondiscrimination

The federal commerce clause grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, between the states, and with Native
American tribes. 7 1 Recognizing that the commerce clause speaks in terms
of powers vested in Congress, courts have long noted that it also limits the
ability of the states to erect barriers against interstate trade.72 If a restriction
on commerce is discriminatory, either on its face or in practical effect, then
it is "virtually per se" invalid.73 Unless the burden imposed on interstate
commerce is clearly excessive relative to the putative local benefits, courts
generally will hold valid a nondiscriminatory regulation, having only
incidental effects on interstate commerce.74 Since a state statute that
directly restricts interstate trade is not necessarily unconstitutional, the
limitation imposed by the dormant commerce clause on state regulatory
power is not absolute.75 Under their general police powers, states retain
authority to regulate matters of "legitimate local concern" even though such
actions may affect incidentally interstate commerce.76
"In determining whether a State has overstepped its role in regulating
interstate commerce, [the Supreme Court] has distinguished between state
statutes that only burden interstate transactions and those that affirmatively
discriminate against such transactions. 77 Statutes in the first group violate

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137
See, e.g., id.; Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.
Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
Id.
Id.
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the commerce clause only if it is clear that the regulation excessively burdens
interstate trade in relation to the putative local benefits, 78 as compared with
"statutes in the second group [that] are subject to more demanding
scrutiny."79 The Hughes Court held that if a state law discriminates against
interstate commerce, "either on its face or in practical effect, the burden falls
on the State to demonstrate both that the statute 'serves a legitimate local
purpose,' and that this purpose could not be served as well by available
nondiscriminatory means."8 Although state regulations that discriminate
against interstate trade must satisfy Hughes'8' strict requirements, Congress
may authorize states to enact regulations otherwise prohibited by the
commerce clause.82 Courts relax the strict interpretation of the commerce
clause where "congressional direction to do so ... [is] unmistakably
clear."83
Under the doctrine of nondiscrimination, the dispositive issue for courts
to decide is whether a given set of facts amounts to discrimination prohibited
by the commerce clause. 84 Thus, the courts should distinguish between "the
abstract issue [of] whether 'alternative means could promote this local
purpose as well without discriminating against interstate commerce' ... [and]
the more specific question [of] whether scientifically accepted techniques
exist"85 for the protection of a state's resources.8 6 While a state is not
required to develop novel and costly means of protecting the free flow of
commerce across its borders, it must make reasonable efforts to avoid
burdening interstate commerce.87
Courts have long recognized that the constitutional principles underlying
the commerce clause cannot be construed narrowly. A narrow construction
would force a state to adopt a wait-and-see approach to protecting its
environment from potentially dangerous NIS.88 In other words, a state
would be required to wait until irreversible environmental damage has
already occurred or until the scientific community has determined which NIS

78. Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
79. Id.; see also Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623-24.
80. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (quoting Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336).
81. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
82. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
83. Id. at 139 (quoting South Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91
(1984)); see also Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. Where other legislative objectives are
advanced and no patent discrimination against interstate trade exists, courts have adopted a
much more flexible approach to the commerce clause doctrine. Id.
84. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 145.
85. Id. at 146 (quoting Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336).

86. See id.
87. Id. at 147.
88. 1d. at 148.
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9 Therefore, a
are dangerous before acting to avoid such consequences.
state's action to prevent irreversible environmental harm to its environment
necessarily be misconstrued as an economic protectionist
should not
90
measure.
"The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of state and local
governments to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce,
but it does not elevate free trade above all other values."' Unless a state
unnecessarily burdens interstate trade or attempts to isolate itself economically, "it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of
its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources. 92 However, a state
must offer substantial evidence that the state action serves legitimate local
purposes that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory
to defeat a claim of arbitrary discrimination against interstate
options in order
93

commerce.

Courts should conclude that the proposed Florida NIS statute satisfies the
two-part test enunciated in Hughes and does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, either facially or in practical effect. 94 If courts find to
the contrary, then Florida must demonstrate both that the statute serves a
legitimate local purpose and the purpose could not be equally served by any
other available nondiscriminatory means. 95 If a state fails to carry this
burden, courts may find that the state law only burdens interstate commerce
incidentally, and the legislation will still pass constitutional muster under
Taylor.96 Applying the above analysis, the proposed NIS statute does not
arbitrarily discriminate against interstate commerce, and a claim against the
statute, based on the doctrine of nondiscrimination, most likely would fail.
B.

State Economic Protectionism

In determining whether a state law violates the commerce clause, courts
generally consider the crucial issue of whether the statute is basically a
protectionist measure or a law addressing legitimate local concerns, having
only incidental effects upon interstate commerce. 97 A state may not attempt
to isolate itself from national problems by erecting a barrier against the

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 151.
Id.
Id.
See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 332.
Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1347

(1994).

97. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
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Shielding in-state industries from
movement of interstate trade. 98
considered a legitimate local purpose
never
almost
is
competition
out-of-state
99
Consequently, courts have held that state laws amounting
by the courts.
to simple economic protectionism are "virtually per se" invalid. ° Recognizing that economic protectionism can reside in the legislative means as well
as the legislative ends, courts have not only applied this rule to the enactment
of laws solely to protect local industries from out-of-state competition, but
also to laws addressing legitimate local concerns that arbitrarily discriminate
against interstate trade.' °' The Philadelphiacase °2 is further illustrative.
In Philadelphia,the Court reiterated the well-settled rule that a state may
not grant its own citizens, over out-of-state consumers, a preferred right of
access to the natural resources located within its borders. 103 Thus, New
Jersey violated the commerce clause when it enacted the Waste Control Act
of 1973.204 Under this Act, the New Jersey Commissioner of Environmental Protection promulgated rules banning the transport of solid wastes into the
state."° 5 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the Act had no
economic discriminatory effect, because it advanced vital health and
environmental objectives and only burdened interstate commerce incidentally.1 6 As a result, the court upheld the Act as permissible under the
commerce clause doctrine. 1 7 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
only issue the Court addressed was whether the Act was constitutionally
permissible in light of the commerce clause.'08 The Court focused on
whether the New Jersey Act constituted a state economic protectionist
measure or a law directed at legitimate local concerns with incidental effects
upon interstate commerce. 1°9 Rejecting the state court's suggestion that the
banning of valueless out-of-state wastes by the Act implicates no
constitutional protection, the Court stated that all objects of interstate trade
merit commerce clause protection. °
Thus, the Philadelphia Court
enunciated that the state of New Jersey may not conserve the disposal
capacity of its landfill sites by barring out-of-state wastes."'

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 627.
Id. at 624.
Id.
Id. at 626; see Taylor, 477 U.S. at 150.
Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 617.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 628.
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The Hughes Court reached a similar result by holding that Oklahoma, in
order to prevent the depletion of its natural minnow population, may not
prohibit their commercial exportation.' 2 However, courts most likely will
not construe all intentional barriers to interstate trade as state economic
protectionism.' 3 Absent clear congressional prohibition and regardless of
the effects of the importation upon the local community, the commerce
clause does not provide an unbridled discretion for citizens to import their
choice articles into a state."14 Where out-of-state goods or services are
most likely to cause substantial impact on public health and safety or on the
environment and natural resources of the state, outright discrimination against
interstate trade may be justifiable as the least intrusive means of achieving
the state's objective."' Applying this analysis to the proposed NIS statute,
courts should find that the legislation does not constitute a protectionist
measure because the statute is applied evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental." 6
C.

The Market ParticipantDoctrine

Under the market participant doctrine, a state can successfully defend
against a claim for violation of the "negative" or "dormant" aspect of the
commerce clause by itself becoming a market participant.'
Consistent
with the national, free-market system is the origin of the dormant commerce
clause. The exception underlying the market participant doctrine emerged
from a Florida case, American Year Book, Inc. v. Askew, affirming
privatization.'
In American Year Book, a federal district court held that

112. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 150 (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 322).
113. Id. (citing Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 458 (1946)).
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 682 ("[Q]uarantine laws have not been
considered forbidden protectionist measures, even though they were directed against out-ofstate commerce.").
116. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
117. David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant
Commerce Clause, Post-Industrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1309, 1318 (1989). The negative or dormant aspect of the commerce clause
empowers the courts to strike down state legislation that conflicts with the nationalizing
policies of the commerce clause, even where Congress is silent or does not exercise its
constitutional power to preempt. Id. at 1313. By contrast, the positive aspect of the
commerce clause grants Congress unrestrained power to regulate economic activities
nationally. Id. Thus, Congress may both void state laws that the dormant commerce clause
would authorize and authorize state laws that the dormant commerce clause would void. 1d.;
see also South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984) ("The marketparticipant doctrine permits a state to influence a discrete, identifiable class of economic
activity in which it is a major participant.").
118. 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D.Fla.), aff'd409 U.S. 904 (1972).
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a Florida statute requiring that the state's public documents be printed within
the state was not violative of the commerce clause. 1 9 A state acts in a
trustee capacity when purchasing labor and materials; absent congressional
action, the commerce clause does not prohibit a state from participating in
the market while favoring its own citizens over others. 120 In reaching its
decision, the court reasoned that if every job specification were subject to
commerce clause attacks, potentially, the impact could interfere with state
The district court's rationale was unsupported by
proprietary activities.'
excepprecedent. 22 However, without discussing the market-participant
23
tion, the U.S Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision.
Market participation is a legally recognized exception for a type of proresident discrimination, which serves a permissible end. 1 4 Therefore, the
test for the market participant exception should be whether the end sought by
the state is permissible and whether the state has a right to keep the resource
that it seeks to retain.2 2 Recognizing a state's actions may be both
participatory and regulatory, courts must address the issue of whether a
regulatory purpose underlies a particular state action. 126 Even if a state
entered business in competition with private firms solely to regulate their
behavior, the regulatory purpose of such action would not necessarily
state from the protection of the market participant
disqualify 2the
7
exemption.
Nevertheless, the concept underlying the market participant doctrine is
suspect because the exception allows a state to circumvent the purposes of
the commerce clause by merely adopting a different governmental posture. 28 Courts that apply the doctrine correctly limit the exception to
certain types of state action. 129 The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc. 3 ' and

119. Id.
120. See Pomper, supra note 117, at 1318; see also Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 94.
121. Pomper, supra note 117, at 1318.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1322.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1324 n.83; see also Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 93 (stating that the scope of
application of the market-participant doctrine has not yet been defined because the doctrine
has only been applied in three cases to date).
129. See Pomper, supra note 117, at 1324.
130. 460 U.S. 204, 205 (1983) ("[I]f the restrictions imposed by the city on construction
projects financed in part by federal funds are directed by Congress, then no dormant
commerce clause issue is presented."); see also Pomper, supra note 117, at 1324.
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South-Central imber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke131 answered the
question of what modes of state action are acceptable. In White, a majority
Court upheld an order from the Mayor of Boston that city residents receive
one half the jobs on city-funded construction projects. 132 Citing to Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., the Court stated that insofar as the city expends
for public
only its own funds in entering into the construction contracts
133
projects, it was entitled to the market participant exception.
In contrast, the Wunnicke Court decided two issues that were not
considered by the court of appeals. 13 4 First, the Court considered whether,
absent congressional approval, Alaska's requirement that timber from state
lands be processed within the state prior to export was permissible because35
Alaska was acting as a market participant rather than as a state regulator.
Second, the Court found that Alaska was not acting as a market participant,
because Alaska was impermissibly seeking to impose regulation on the
timber-processing market in which it was not a market participant.'3 6 The
Court struck down the regulation as unauthorized by Congress and violative
of the commerce clause. 37 Since the facts of Wunnicke are analogous to
Philadelphia,the Court concluded that the state regulation was per se invalid
because of the protectionist nature of the Alaska's local38 processing
requirement and the resulting burden on interstate commerce.'
In Philadelphia,the city of Philadelphia appealed a New Jersey Supreme
Court decision upholding the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that
prohibited the importation of most solid or liquid wastes originating or
collected outside the territorial limits of New Jersey except for garbage to be
fed to swine.' 39 Reversing the judgement of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute violated the commerce
clause. 140
To overcome the hurdles of the commerce clause, New Jersey could

131. 467 U.S. 82 (1984); see also Pomper, supra note 117, at 1325 ("[T]he Court struck
down a regulation under which Alaska sold timber from state lands only to bidders who would
perform their initial lumber-processing within the state.").
132. White, 460 U.S. at 205.
133. Id. (citing Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794 (1976)). "The basic distinction drawn in
Alexandria Scrap between States as market participants and States as market regulators makes
Id. at 207 (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436good sense and sound law .
37 (1980)).
134. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 87.
135. Id. at 93-99.
136. Id. at 100.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 100.
140. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

15

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 7
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. I0

become a market participant by constructing and operating a state
landfill. 4 ' New Jersey, as a market participant under the commerce clause,
could then charge in-state customers one rate while charging out-of-state
customers a significantly higher rate, in order to discourage out-of-state
garbage transport into New Jersey. 42 Without violating the commerce
clause, New Jersey also could add a surcharge to all solid waste received by
private landfill operators in New Jersey. 43 Facially, New Jersey would be
openly discriminating against interstate commerce. In practical effect, the
state would be discriminating equally as an economic competitor rather than
as a state regulator, and this would not be violative of the commerce
clause.'"
Philadelphiaand the line of cases that relied on its decision as precedent
were wrongly decided. 45 Congress necessarily should act now to enact
laws overturning what is clearly a series of erroneous decisions and define
the ambit of interstate commerce. Although the market participant doctrine
provides an exception to the dormant commerce clause, some states would
be reluctant to become market participants, as in Philadelphia,because of
state budgetary restraints and the significant environmental problems,
liability, and costs attendant on landfill operation. The market participant
doctrine, which is an escape clause to the Philadelphiadilemma, is inherently
suspect because it permits a state to reduce or prohibit the free flow of
interstate trade and commerce. Under Philadelphia, a federal commerce
clause challenge to the proposed NIS statute, based on state economic
protectionism, most likely would fail. In the enforcement of the statute,
Florida would become a market participant and not an economic regulator
because the FGFFC, a state constitutional and state-funded agency, also is
engaged in the introduction and management of NIS in the state. Distinguishing Philadelphia,Florida's enactment of the proposed NIS statute would
not close the state's border entirely, arbitrarily discriminating against
interstate or international trade in NIS. Florida satisfies. the market
participant doctrine exception, rendering the proposed NIS statute not
violative of the commerce clause.
V.

IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN EXOTIC SPECIES

The proposed NIS statute will not exceed the jurisdictional reach of any
46
applicable federal regulations, including but not limited to the Lacey Act.'

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

White, 460 U.S. at 210.
Hughes, 426 U.S. at 805; see also Pomper, supra note 117, at 1318.
Hughes, 426 U.S. at 805.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 93.
Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 630-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See infra app. § 372.45, at p. 219.
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Under section 372.301 of the proposed NIS statute, courts would have the
authority to recognize and enforce all international, multilateral, and bilateral
treaties regulating NIS. 47 Similar to the Lacey Act, courts could apply it
extraterritorially against any illegal trade in exotic plant and animal species
by marrying the statute to a specific foreign law or an international, bilateral,
or multilateral treaty enforcing wildlife
laws and regulations to which the
48
state.
contracting
a
is
States
United
VI.

SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE LACEY ACT

The Lacey Act was the first recognizable federal attempt to regulate the
introduction and importation of exotic species into the United States. 149 In
enacting this regulation, Congress recognized that exotic fish and wildlife
could pose a danger to human, forestry, agricultural, and horticultural
interests, as well as to the health and welfare of indigenous species 50
Under the Lacey Act, it is unlawful to "import, export, transport, sell,
receive, acquire, or purchase fish or wildlife or plants taken, possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of the United
States." 5 Most significant for the protection of individual state interests,
the Lacey Act also makes it a federal offense for any person to "possess or
take fish or wildlife in violation of state laws or regulations."' 52
The FWS is charged with the responsibility of promulgating regulations
enforcing the Lacey Act, and these regulations generally prohibit the
importation or transportation of live wildlife or eggs that are injurious to the
interest of the United States. 5 3 The scope of the Act is very narrow
because the regulations promulgated by the FWS prohibit only the most
egregious exotic species.' 54 Under the regulations, exotic species may be
imported into the United States unless they are considered "injurious
wildlife."'5 15 This regulatory system is referred to as the injurious or
prohibited, dirty-list approach.' 56 Although detrimental to U.S. interests,
any person may still import an injurious species not accorded complete "ferae

147. Infra app. § 372.301, at p. 213.
148. Gary D. Meyers & Kyla Seigsohn Bennett, Answering "The Call of The Wild": An
Examination of U.S. Participationin International Wildlife Law, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 75,

107-08 (1989).
149. John L. Dentler, Noah's Farce: The Regulation and Control of Exotic Fish and
Wildlife, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REv. 191, 210 (1993).
150. Id.

151.
152.
153.
154.

16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1).
See Dentler, supra note 149, at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 210-11.

155. Id.
156. Id.
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naturae non grata status," under an injurious wildlife permit issued by the
Director of the FWS. 57
Under the injurious or prohibited wildlife approach, the Department of
the Interior's list of injurious species includes only those species that the
Department has learned, through third-party experience, present a distinct
harm to indigenous species or other interests.1 58 As a result of the significant delay before a species can be classified as injurious, a species already
may have been imported and released or have escaped into the environment. 159 Despite the dangers of environmental exposure to a vast number
of unknown injurious species, the U.S. list of injurious wildlife remains
sparse. 6° Under the Lacey Act, a person may obtain a permit to import,
transport, or acquire all non dirty-list wildlife by merely filing an import
declaration with the District Director of the U.S. Customs Service.1 6 '
Clearly, the Act is impractical and has a limited effect on the importation of
exotic species. 62
Among the Lacey Act's most notable limitations are its all-or-nothing
approach and its short list of injurious NIS. 1 63 The Lacey Act fails to
prohibit the introduction of numerous potentially harmful NIS,which present
grave dangers to indigenous species, human health and welfare, and the
natural environment. 64 The Lacey Act also fails to address the consequences of accidental release or escape of viruses, diseases, or parasites that are
associated with harmful NIS and could adversely affect native fish, wildlife,
and human populations. 165 Instead of addressing these concerns, Congress
relegated the responsibility to individual states. 66 Unlike other federal
regulations, such as the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) 167 and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 16 the Lacey Act does
not prevent other federal agencies and programs from importing or

157. Id. at 211. "An injurious wildlife designation is typically reserved for species known
for harmful characteristics such as large carnivorous animals with high reproductive rates
(raccoon dog), or animals with the potential to exact harm on agricultural crops (fruit bats)."
Id. at 211 n.107; see also 50 C.F.R. 16.15 (1992).
158. See Dentler, supra note 149, at 211.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.at 211-12.
162. Id.at 212.

163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id.

166. Id.
167. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). The ESA requires that all federal agencies "insure
that any [federal] action authorized, funded, or carried out ...is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of habitat of such species." Id. § 1536(a)(2).
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
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introducing exotic species.'
VII.

69

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE LACEY ACT

A.

The Effects Test

Absent legislative guidance, early judicial decisions relied on the "Law
of Nations" or international law to define the extraterritorial reach of federal
law. 170 During the nineteenth century, international law authorities adhered
to strict territorial limits on national jurisdiction. 7' As a result, the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted a presumption against the extraterritorial application
of federal laws unless Congress clearly expressed its intent to apply these
laws extraterritorially.172 In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the
Supreme Court determined the Sherman Act could not govern a dispute
involving an alleged monopoly because the events occurred outside the
United States. 73 The Court noted that an "almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the
law of the country where the act is done."' 74
The presumption against extraterritorial application of antitrust laws was
liberalized in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA).' 75 In
ALCOA, the court was asked to determine whether various contractual
agreements made by ALCOA outside of the United States could be governed
by the Sherman Act. 76 The court concluded that the Sherman Act could
apply to the agreements even though the acts occurred outside the United
States because they had intended and actual negative effects on U.S.
commerce. 77 This analysis came to be known as the "effects test". 178
The effects test was modified in flmberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, which also involved the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act.' 79 The Timberlane Lumber Company urged the court to apply the
Sherman Act to an activity that had occurred outside the United States

169. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378.
170. Gary B. Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 1 (1992); see also BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 11, 44-75 (2d ed. 1990). The "Law of Nations" or International law defines
the body of rules and principles of action that are binding upon civilized states in their interrelationships. Id. at 11.
171. See Born, supra note 170, at 1.
172. Id.; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 347-59 (1909).
173. 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909).
174. Id. at 356.
175. 148 F.2d 416, 416-48 (2d Cir. 1945).
176. Id. at 442.
177. Id. at 443-44.
178. Id.
179. 549 F.2d 597, 597-615 (9th Cir. 1977).
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because the alleged illegal activity had a direct and substantial effect on
activities inside the United States.180 In response, the court devised a threepart test. 8 ' Before exercising jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, courts
should consider whether 1) the alleged activity had any effect on U.S. foreign
commerce, 2) the effect is sufficiently substantial to cause a cognizable injury
to the plaintiff, and 3) whether the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United
States should be asserted to cover the activity as a matter of international
comity and fairness. 2 The court asserted seven factors to be considered
when determining whether exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction violates
international comity.183
One of the more recent cases involving the extraterritorial reach of
federal laws is Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.'84 In Hartford
Fire, the Supreme Court effectively returned to the ALCOA effects test by
holding that application of the Sherman Act was appropriate because the
foreign activity was intended to and actually did produce substantial effects
in the United States.8 5 The Court concluded that the international comity
test used in Jimberlane was not necessary to decide the extraterritorial reach
of the Sherman Act because no "true conflict" existed between the United
States and foreign law.' 86 In other words, courts would only need to take
into account international comity when a "true conflict" exists, and a "true
conflict" only occurs when it is impossible for the parties to comply with the
laws of both parties.8 7
Congress did not state a clear legislative intent that the Lacey Act applies
beyond the territorial border of the United States. 188 However, courts could
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Lacey Act by applying the
effects test. For example, where the taking of wildlife occurs in a foreign
country but would be illegal under the Lacey Act, those actions should be
subject to the civil or criminal sanctions of the Lacey Act based on the
effects test. 89 First, U.S. agricultural and horticultural industries and
indigenous species could be harmed by new diseases, predators, and the
reduction of natural populations through habitat encroachment if NIS are
introduced into the United States.' 90 Second, the illegal taking of wildlife

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 601.
Id. at 613.

Id.
Id. at 614.
113 S. Ct. 2891, 2891-922 (1993).
Id. at 2910.
Id.

Id.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378.
Shepard, supra note 60, at 89.
Id.
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in foreign countries depletes the population of those species in their native
habitat, thereby contributing to their decline for recreational and nonconsumptive uses. 9 '
B.

InternationalLaw Principle of Sovereign Jurisdiction

Absent a permissive rule to the contrary, the most stringent restriction
that international law imposes on a sovereign state is that one nation state
may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another, giving rise
to the doctrine of territorial presumption. Constrained by this doctrinal
principle, sovereign jurisdiction is presumed territorial, and therefore, cannot
be exercised extraterritorially except when permissible under an international
custom, convention, or treaty. 192 However, a presumption of territoriality
cannot be assumed.
International law governs the interrelationship between independent states
and does not prohibit a state from extending the application of its laws and
the jurisdiction of its courts to persons and property outside its territorial
border.'93 A sovereign state may exercise its jurisdictional authority
extraterritorially to define and punish selected crimes, applying customary
international law or the international law principle of "universal jurisdiction."' This principle of universal jurisdiction is best demonstrated by the
controversial S.S."Lotus" case. 195
In S.S. Lotus, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was
asked to determine whether the principles of international law prevented
Turkey from instituting criminal proceedings under Turkish laws against a
French citizen for an act committed on the high seas. 196 Instead, the PCIJ
addressed the issue of whether a rule of international law exists that
constrains the power of sovereign states to extend the criminal jurisdiction
of their courts extraterritorially. 97 By invoking this international law
principle, Turkey asserted its sovereign jurisdiction to define Turkish law
extraterritorially and prosecuted a French citizen for a collision that occurred
between the French mail steamer Lotus and the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt in.
which eight Turkish citizens were killed. 9 ' Turkey based its assertion of

191. Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4
(1986)).
192. See generally Johnathan Turley, "When in Rome:" MultinationalMisconduct and the
PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598 (1990) (analyzing and critiquing, in depth, the presumption against extraterritoriality).
193. S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
194. Id. at 23.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 4.
197. Id. at 23-24.
198. Id. at 10-11.
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sovereign jurisdiction to criminally prosecute the French Merchant Service
Lieutenant on a claim that the act that had produced an effect on the Turkish
vessel was deemed to have been committed on Turkish territory because of
the egregious nature of the offense.' 99 Among the objections raised by the
French Government was that Turkey's institution of the proceeding was
contrary to the principles of international law.200 France also contended
that Turkey must cite a rule of international law authorizing that country to
exercise its jurisdiction beyond its territorial borders.20"
The court rejected France's arguments and stated that generally accepted
principles of international law permitted Turkey's actions.2 2 The court
concluded that the territoriality of criminal law is not an absolute principle
underlying international law and does not by itself define territorial
sovereignty. 0 3 Further, there are no international laws that limit the
exclusivity of criminal proceedings to the territorial jurisdiction of the ship's
country of registry. 204 Thus, the court ruled that the S.S. Lotus case was
one of concurrent jurisdiction.20 5
Where U.S. interests are not adequately protected by the enforcement of
the Lacey Act, courts similarly exercise jurisdictional authority extraterritorially to define and punish selected wildlife violations deemed criminal
in the United States by applying customary international law or the
international law principle of universal jurisdiction.
C.

Marriageof the Lacey Act to InternationalTreaties

U.S. laws generally will not apply extraterritorially absent a clear
legislative intent.20 6 However, treaties and conventions are proven channels
for circumvention of this dictate.20 7 But the issue of whether treaties
199. Id. at 9.
200. Id. at 22. France claimed that under international law, Turkey could not ground its
criminal proceeding for an offense committed by a foreigner on board a vessel simply on the
basis of the victim's nationality, and therefore, the offense should be regarded as having been
committed on board the French vessel. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 23.
203. Id. at 20.
204. Id. at 30.
205. Id. at 30-31.
206. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). "It is a longstanding
principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' Id. at 248
(quoting Foley Bros. v. United States, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)); see also Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 185 (1952) (Congressional legislation is presumed not to extend
extraterritorially unless contrary intent is evidenced.).
207. SIMON LYsTER, INTERNATIONAL WDLFE LAW 3 (1993). Most sovereign states have
a parliament, a congress, a national assembly, or similar institutions to legislate laws that are
binding on their citizens. Id. Unlike sovereign states, the international community has no
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preempt U.S. constitutional and domestic laws must be resolved. The
ratification process of a treaty serves primarily to reconcile treaty law with
constitutional law and treaty law with domestic law.2 °8 Thus, the process
of ratification precludes any possible conflict of treaty interpretation with
constitutional and domestic law.20 9 As a result, no U.S. case has been
decided on the issue of treaty law preempting or being preempted by
constitutional or domestic law.2 10
In 1973, the U.S. Congress enacted the ESA 2" as the national legislation for implementing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 2 12 an international treaty
prohibiting international trade in endangered species and of which the United
States is a signatory state.2 13 By enforcing this piece of environmental
protection legislation territorially, the United States could effectively extend
ESA jurisdictional authority extraterritorially, indirectly restricting international trade. However, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively rejected this
notion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.214 In this case, the Court
embraced the principle of territorial presumption, by denying the Defenders
of Wildlife standing to challenge the territorial reach of the ESA.1 s
In Lujan, the Defenders of Wildlife petitioned the Court for judicial
review of a joint FWS and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
interpretive rule that limited the geographic scope of the ESA to the United

legislature to enact laws binding on sovereign states or their citizens absent an international
agreement. Id. Treaties and conventions remedy for this international dilemma. Id.
208. Id. at 6. "Treaties are normally implemented by national legislation, and national law
is much easier to enforce than international law." Id. at 13.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 11.

211. Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1541 (1994)); see
also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS -

LAW, SCIENCE, AND

POLICY 1090-92 (1992). The ESA specifically constrains federal agencies from engaging in
any activities that are likely to have an adverse effect on protected species and prohibits the
"taking" of these species. Id. at 1091. Further, the ESA prohibits the importation of
endangered species into the United States. Id. Under the ESA, the courts have broadly
construed the term "take" to mean habitat destruction and alteration, which includes the
introduction of exotic species and its impact on the habitats of native endangered species. Id.
at 1092. Thus, the ESA may be used to prohibit and regulate trade in exotic animals,
domestically and internationally, but only if an indigenous species is already deemed endangered or threatened. Id.
212. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087.
213. Id.; see also Melissa K. Estes, The Effect of the FederalEndangeredSpecies Act on

State Water Rights, 22 ENVTL. L. 1027, 1028 (1992) ("The ESA protects species that are
threatened or in danger of extinction by constraining federal agencies from engaging in
activities that have adverse impacts on the protected species, and by prohibiting all persons
under the jurisdiction of the United States from 'taking' members of the protected species.").
214. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
215. See id. at 566.
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States and the high seas.216 The only issue the Court considered was
whether Defenders of Wildlife satisfied the constitutional minimum
requirement of standing to seek judicial review of the challenged rule
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, interpreting section 7 of the
ESA.217 The Court concluded that Defenders of Wildlife lacked standing
to challenge the new rule.2 I8 In effect, the Court's ruling rendered the issue
of extraterritorial application of the ESA moot since the Court did not reach
consideration of that issue. 219 By denying Defenders of Wildlife standing,
the Court's holding preempted any extraterritorial application of the ESA.
Despite the adverse impact of the Lujan decision, jurisdictional reach of
U.S. domestic laws can be expanded extraterritorially, without congressional
mandate, by marrying the domestic regulation to a specific international
bilateral or multilateral treaty to which the United States is a signatory
state.22 ° Standing alone, the Lacey Act does not apply extraterritorially.
However, courts have applied the Lacey Act extraterritorially to enforce
221 Newell v. Baldridge222
CITES or foreign laws that protect wildlife.
223
and United States v. 3,210 Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus Yacare
are illustrative. In Newell, the NMFS charged and obtained a civil penalty
against the President of Far East Aquatic Imports for illegally importing,
selling, and delivering an endangered species and thus, violating the
ESA.224 The NMFS also successfully prosecuted him for violating the
Lacey Act by transporting sea turtles in foreign commerce without proper
labelling.225 Similarly, in 3,120 Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus
Yacare, the FWS sought and obtained forfeiture of 10,870 hides of Caiman
crocodilus yacare, an endangered species native to Bolivia, in freight from
Bolivia to France. 226 The airway bill and the CITES permit had listed the
shipment as Caiman crocodilus, a nonendangered species indigenous to
Bolivia.227 The court found that most of the confiscated hides did not
satisfy the size requirement under Bolivian law. 228 Thus, the court ordered

216. Id. at 557-58.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
at 109.
227.
228.
148, at

Id. at 558.
Id. at 578.
Id.
See Meyers & Bennett, supra note 148, at 108-09.
Id.
548 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
636 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
Newell, 548 F. Supp. at 41; Meyers & Bennett, supra note 148, at 108.
Newell, 548 F. Supp. at 41; Meyers & Bennett, supra note 148, at 108.
3,210 Crusted Sides, 636 F. Supp. at 1281, 1287; Meyers & Bennett, supra note 148,
3,210 CrustedSides, 636 F. Supp. at 1283; Meyers & Bennett, supra note 148, at 109.
3,210 Crusted Sides, 636 F. Supp. at 1283, 1285-86; Meyers & Bennett, supra note
109.
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confiscation of the hides pursuant to the Lacey Act and CITES.229
These cases set the precedent for courts to hold persons liable for
violation of foreign laws under U.S. domestic laws, including the Lacey Act
and the ESA.23 ° Specifically, the Lacey Act can serve as a powerful
remedy where international trade in wildlife runs afoul of foreign or domestic
laws, including mislabelling or illegal shipment. 231' Further, Congress
should become cognizant of the fact that the judiciary is moving to fill some
of the gaps in the Lacey Act where Congress seems reluctant to do so.
VIII.

AMENDING THE LACEY ACT TO INCORPORATE THE APPROACH OF
THE PROPOSED NIS STATUTE

Congressional action to amend the Lacey Act to incorporate the proposed
Florida NIS statute, three-part list approach could address some concerns.2 32
The federal, injurious dirty-list approach prohibits the importation of only the
most egregious species and allows the importation of unlisted species.233
This ad hoc regulatory approach puts the burden on regulators to determine
whether a species is harmful. 234 In contrast, the clean-list approach
prohibits importation of all NIS unless they are determined to be acceptable
and merit inclusion on the clean list. 235

Unlike the federal dirty-list

approach, the clean-list approach puts the burden on the importer to prove
that a NIS is not harmful.236
In regulating the introduction and management of NIS, most governments
adopt a system somewhere between the clean-list and dirty-list approaches,
but they substantially incline toward the dirty-list approach. 237
The
proposed NIS statute's approach is an effective way of reducing the risk of
harmful invasions by employing a system of both clean and dirty lists, as
well as, a gray or conditional category of unanalyzed species that are
238
prohibited until they have been analyzed and proven nonharmful.
Adopting "a clean-list approach would require substantial changes in the
regulation of importation ...

[of] NIS

...

into the [United States] or a

239

particular State.
Invariably, permitting the importation of only NIS on
a nonprohibited list would translate into greater restrictions on international

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

3,210 CrustedSides, 636 F. Supp. at 1287; Meyers & Bennett, supra note 148, at 109.
Meyers & Bennett, supra note 148, at 109.
Id.
See OTA Report, supra note 7, at 22; see also infra app. § 372.31.
See OTA Report, supra note 7, at 22.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23.
Id.; see also infra app. § 372.31.
OTA Report, supra note 7, at 108; see also infra app. § 372.31.
See infra app. § 372.31.
OTA Report, supra note 7, at 109; see also infra app. § 372.302.
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trade. 240 Although the clean-list approach is more burdensome in the short
run, it most likely would be more effective in preventing harm to the
environment.24 ' Since no court has ruled on the FWS interpretation that
the Lacey Act is legally broad enough to accommodate the nonprohibited list
approach without an amendment, the issue turns on how best to regulate
potentially risky NIS. 242

One possibility is a three-part system with an

intermediate "gray" category as suggested by the OTA.243
The current Lacey Act prohibited list is inadequate because it only
prohibits or restricts the entry into the United States of two families, thirteen
genera, and six species. 244 Congress may be reluctant to act because it is
unaware of the dangers posed by non-listed NIS. This is a direct result of
the failure of the FWS to use a checklist or other standardized procedure to
analyze risks from other imported NIS.2 4' The FWS must enforce the ESA
in conjunction with CITES to prohibit or restrict the flow of harmful,
threatened, or endangered species into the United States.246 Under the
Lacey Act, the interstate transport of federally-listed NIS is not
prohibited.24 7 In other words, unauthorized movements of listed, harmful
NIS within the United States, such as the zebra mussels, do not constitute a
federal offense unless prosecuted under CITES.248 The 1981 Lacey Act
Amendments now provide limited remedy by making the interstate
transportation of state-listed, injurious NIS a federally enforceable offense. 249 A more comprehensive approach to remedying the inadequacies
of the Lacey Act, would require an amendment to the regulation, adopting
the proposed NIS statute's three-part approach and the ability to enforce
international treaties.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The proposed model Florida NIS statute clearly closes some of the
loopholes left open by the Lacey Act. By substituting the structured
licensing and permitting approach of the proposed NIS statute for the Lacey
240. OTA Report, supra note 7, at 109.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.; see also infra app. §§ 372.30-.46, at pp. 212-19.
244. OTA Report, supra note 7, at 119. The FWS is the authorized federal agency that
has the responsibility for regulating the importation of injurious species into the United States
under the Lacey Act. Id. at 185. "Current [FWS] regulations prohibit or restrict entry to the
United States of two families of fishes; 18 genera or species of mammals, birds, reptiles, and
shellfish; and two fish pathogens." Id.
245. Id. at 119.
246. Id. at 185.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss1/7

26

Baruch: The Proposed Florida Nonindigenous Species Statute: A Salvation f
1995]

PROPOSEDFLORIDA NIS STATUTE

211

Act's dirty-list approach, Congress could better achieve its legislative
objectives. The significant gaps in environmental legislation are a result of
a federal and state patchwork of laws, regulations, and programs. Filling
some of these loopholes will require legislative changes. Others will require
more adequate implementation and enforcement mechanisms be put into
place. Congress should amend the Lacey Act by adopting the proposed NIS
statute's three-part approach and extending the jurisdictional application of
the Lacey Act extraterritorially, giving effect to the Lacey Act to enforce
foreign laws and bilateral, multilateral, and international treaties regulating
exotic species.
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X.

THE PROPOSED MODEL FLORIDA
NON-INDIGENOUS SPECIES STATUTE25°

Title XXVIII Non-Indigenous Species
CHAPTER 372
WILDLIFE
F.S. at 372.30-372.46 (1996)
372.30 Legislative Purpose.
372.301 Legal Authority.
372.302 Legislative Intent and Construction.
372.31 Definitions
372.32 Administration and Enforcement.
372.33 Non-Indigenous Species Assessment Board.
372.34 Non-Indigenous Species Oversight Committee.
372.35 Non-Indigenous Species Classification System.
372.36 Licensing and Permitting of Non-Indigenous Species.
372.361 Exemptions.
372.37 Assessment of Non-Indigenous Species.
372.38 Reassessment of Non-Indigenous Species.
372.39 Administrative Remedies and Public Participation.
372.40 Citizens' Civil Action
372.41 National and International Trade and Commerce.
372.42 Penalties.
372.43 Other Legal Remedies.
372.44 Public Education.
372.45 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.
372.46 Amendments.
372.30 Legislative Purpose. - The State of Florida recognizes the
increasing biological, human health and economic consequences associated
with Non-Indigenous Species (NIS) and the need to update existing policies
addressing NIS to minimize current and future harmful impacts resulting
from the introduction and management of NIS in the State of Florida.
Relatively few NIS have clearly demonstrated severe economic consequences

250. The Florida Non-Indigenous Species Statute, a proposed model regulation for the
introduction and management of exotic species in the State of Florida, was drafted for Thomas
T. Ankersen, Staff Attorney, Center for Governmental Responsibility at the University of
Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Florida, and Professor in International Environmental
Law Seminar on International Wildlife, by Shannon K. Baruch and Warren T. Coleman, Fall
Semester, 1995.
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for Florida and, in many instances, NIS provide economic benefits.
However, in aggregate, harmful NIS have caused extensive loss of economic
revenue, imposed extensive economic costs for control and eradication, pose
threats to human health, and have caused the loss of the State of Florida's
natural areas and resources. Florida is home to more NIS, including both
flora and fauna, than any other state in the United States due to the state's
favorable subtropical climate, use as an entry point for international trade,
large ornamental horticulture and tropical fish industries and its role as a
significant agricultural producer. Therefore, the local, state, national and
international significance of limiting the incidence of harmful NIS in Florida
poses a compelling state interest. The proposed Florida NIS statute is
designed to maintain the economic and educational value of Florida's use of
NIS and, also, to minimize current and future negative biological and social
costs due to the importation, use and release of harmful NIS.
The proposed Florida NIS statute authorizes the enactment of a
comprehensive assessment program to assess NIS prior to their arrival in
Florida and a licensing and permitting program to certify and monitor the use
of NIS; provides an appropriate means for public and interagency review of
potential NIS certifications; and incorporates existing federal, state and local
policies to enhance the state's regulatory program and promote the efficient
use of available resources.
Thus, the proposed Florida NIS statute authorizes the formulation of a
new and comprehensive set of rules and regulations, utilizing existing federal
and state policies, which shall supplement the existing Florida rules and
regulations of NIS administered by the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish
Commission (FGFFC). The FGFFC shall be responsible for developing and
formulating the rules and regulations necessary for consistency and full
compliance with the intent and guidelines of the proposed Florida NIS
statute.
372.301 Legal Authority. - The Lacey Act designates to individual states
the authority to regulate NIS fish and wildlife in the United States. The State
of Florida adopts, by reference, the Lacey Act as the legal basis for the
proposed Florida NIS statute. Under the proposed Florida NIS statute, courts
shall recognize and enforce all international, multilateral and bilateral
agreements regarding NIS.
372.302 Legislative Intent and Construction. - The legislative intent of
the proposed Florida NIS statute is threefold. First, the Legislature intends
that the proposed Florida NIS statute minimizes the current and future
impacts and/or occurrence of harmful NIS in Florida. Second, that the
proposed Florida NIS statute updates the procedural framework of NIS
assessment and provide a framework for public and interagency review of
potential NIS certifications. Third, that the proposed Florida NIS statute
provides a regulatory framework designed to meet the future needs of the
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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State of Florida through a dynamic process of NIS classification and
monitoring.
Absent a State of Florida constitutional amendment, subjecting the
FGFFC to the jurisdiction of the executive branch, the Legislature further
intends that the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission adopt this
proposed Florida NIS statute and promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations consistent with the legislative intent of the statute.
372.31 Definitions. (1) Non-Indigenous Species mean an organism not previously legally
imported into the State of Florida and/or not native of the State of Florida
including, but not limited to, all domesticated and feral species, all nonnaturally occurring hybrids or genetically engineered organisms.
(2) Non-Prohibited Species mean all NIS known to pose an insignificant
biological, ecological, human health, and economic threat to the State of
Florida, defined by the Non-Indigenous Species Assessment Board (NISAB)
which may be imported, exported, used or released subject to the proposed
Florida NIS statute assessment protocol and licensing and permitting
procedures.
(3) Prohibited Species mean all NIS known to pose a reasonable
biological, ecological, human health, or economic threat to the State of
Florida.
These prohibited species shall not be imported, exported,
transported, sold, received, acquired, possessed or purchased unless subject
to the NIS assessment protocol and licensing and permitting procedures,
defined by the proposed Florida NIS statute and Florida Game and
Freshwater Fish Commission regulations.
(4) Conditional Species shall include all NIS not classified under the
proposed Florida NIS statute as Non-Prohibited or Prohibited species which,
upon request to be imported, exported, transported, sold, received, acquired,
possessed or purchased, must be subject to the proposed Florida NIS statute
and Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission assessment protocol and
licensing and permitting procedures. Upon completion of the NIS assessment
protocol and final decision on licensing and permitting procedures,
Conditional Species shall be classified by the NISAB as Non-Prohibited or
Prohibited Species.
372.32 Administration and Enforcement. (1) Except where federal laws preempt the proposed Florida NIS statute,
and consistent with Section 9, Constitution of the State of Florida, the Game
and Freshwater Fish Commission shall adopt the proposed Florida NIS statute
as a legislation in aid of the Commission and shall promulgate rules and
regulations to administer and enforce all provisions of the proposed Florida
NIS statute.
(2) The Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida shall be responsible for administering the provisions of the proposed Florida NIS statute in
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss1/7
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regards to licensing and permitting when the FGFFC engages in the
importation, exportation, transportation, sale, purchase, acquisition, possession
or release of NIS. The NISAB shall remain the responsible body for the
assessment of the potential use of NIS by the FGFFC. Notice of and the
activity of providing for a public hearing regarding the FGFFC's use of NIS
shall be the responsibility of the Governor and Cabinet.
(3) All provisions of the proposed Florida NIS statutes shall be subject
to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act.
(4) Inspections and quarantines conducted by the federal Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) and U.S. Customs shall supplement the Florida NIS statutory
requirements of licenses and permits required for the importation, exportation
and transportation of NIS.
372.33 Non-Indigenous Species Assessment Board. (1) The FGFFC shall create a Non-Indigenous Species Assessment
Board (NISAB), approved by the Non-Indigenous Species Oversight
Committee (NISOC), responsible for the express purpose of assessing the
biological, ecological, human health and economic impacts of NIS prior to
its arrival in the State of Florida and setting regulatory standards for the
management of NIS in Florida.
(2) Upon completion of an NIS assessment, the NISAB shall classify the
NIS in accordance with the proposed Florida NIS statute classification
system.
(3) The NISAB shall maintain and make available information on the
impact and management of MS introduced into the State of Florida.
(4) The NISAB shall promote public awareness of harmful NIS through
the development of an Educational Program, outlined in the proposed Florida
NIS statute.
372.34 Non-Indigenous Species Oversight Committee. (1) The Governor shall appoint a seven-member Non-Indigenous Species
Oversight Committee which shall monitor the compliance and enforcement
activities of both state and federal agencies in an advisory capacity.
Members of the NISOC shall be selected from the general community of
diverse expertise and their term of office shall run concurrently with the
appointing-Governor's administration.
(2) The NISOC shall hear public complaints regarding introductions and
management of NIS from citizens including, but not limited to, persons
whose substantial interests are not directly affected and for whom the Florida
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides no remedy.
(3) The NISOC shall receive NIS assessment results from the NISAB
during the twenty-one (21) day period following a decision and offer
comment to the NISAB and the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish
Commission on recorded and pending NIS assessments. The decisions and
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

31

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 7
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10

expressed opinions of the NISOC shall have no legally binding effect nor
shall establish any legal precedent.
372.35 Non-Indigenous Species Classification System. (1) The FGFFC shall establish three classifications of NIS under this
statute, defined in Section 372.31: (a) Non-Prohibited Species, (b) Prohibited
Species and (c) Conditional Species
(2) Where applicable, the NISAB's initial classification of any NIS shall
utilize existing federal, state and local classifications of NIS. The NISAB
shall classify any federal, state or local prohibited, restricted or injuriousclassified NIS as a Prohibited Species under the NIS Classification System
provision of this statute.
(3) The NISAB shall continually modify the NIS Classification System
following the assessment of conditional NIS and as new information
regarding Non-Prohibited and Prohibited NIS becomes available.
(4) Pending receipt of new information and reassessment of a NIS, the
NISAB shall reclassify the NIS in accordance with the NIS Classification
System provision of this statute.
372.36 Licensing and Permitting of Non-Indigenous Species. (1) Irrespective of the NIS classification, all importation, exportation,
transportation, possession, sale, use and release of NIS in the State of Florida
are subject to the statutory requirements for licensing and permitting under
this statute.
(2) The FGFFC shall be the authorized agency responsible for the
licensing and permitting of NIS in the State of Florida.
(3) The NISAB shall be responsible for the assessment and classification
of NIS and shall make recommendations to the FGFFC to grant or deny a
license and permit based on their assessment of the NIS in question.
(4) Licensing shall be required for the importation and transportation of
NIS in the State of Florida. Granting of a license for the importation of NIS
shall be on a "one-time" basis only and each incidence of NIS importation
shall require a license.
(5) Permitting shall be required for personal and commercial use,
containment, sale, possession and release of NIS in the State of Florida.
(6) Issuance of a permit for the use, containment, sale, possession and
release of NIS in the State of Florida shall not be valid for a period
exceeding five (5) years and will be subject to renewal upon submittal of an
application by the permittee and approval granted by the FGFFC.
(7) The FGFFC shall require all applicants that are issued a licenser or
permit to furnish a bond in the form of a letter of credit payable to the State
of Florida that will be consistent with the level of risk determined by the
NISAB. This bond will be used to recover the costs of control or eradication
in the event of an unauthorized, accidental or intentional release of the NIS.
(8) The FGFFC shall conduct annual scheduled inspections to determine
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the permittee's compliance with licensing and permitting provisions. The
FGFFC shall supplemented the annual scheduled inspections with
unscheduled and unannounced inspections to determine the permittee's
compliance with the licensing and permitting of NIS provisions of the statute.
(9) The NISAB, following an assessment, will classify a NIS as NonProhibited or Prohibited. Subsequent requests for the importation of a
previously classified NIS will not require an additional assessment, however
the importer will have to comply with the controls or restrictions placed on
that NIS and be able to demonstrate that the NIS is identical to the species
previously approved.
372.361 Exemptions. (1) Use of a NIS by recognized research institutions for testing or
manipulation of NIS shall be subject to the licensing and permitting
provisions of this statute. However, those institutions shall not be required
to satisfy the burden of proof requirement for the assessment of NIS.
(2) Transportation of NIS through the State of Florida shall be subject
to the licensing and permitting provisions of this statute. However, the
responsible party or parties shall not be required to satisfy the burden of
proof requirement for the assessment of NIS provided that the transportation
of the NIS under permit and license will not be transferred or sold in the
State of Florida
(3) Use of a NIS by public viewing arenas including, but not limited to,
zoos and aquariums shall be subject to the licensing and permitting
provisions of this statute. However, the responsible party or parties shall not
be required to satisfy the burden of proof requirement for the assessment of
NIS.
372.37 Assessment of Non-Indigenous Species. (1) The NISAB shall be responsible for the assessment of NIS prior to
their importation into the State of Florida.
(2) The NISAB shall make assessments on the basis of the potential
biological, ecological, human health and economic threats that may occur
from the NIS under assessment. Ecological risk analysis should be
considered as a method for such assessment, however the final assessment
procedure adopted by the NISAB shall be promulgated as a rule by the
FGFFC.
(3) An applicant for either a license, permit or both, to import, sell,
receive, acquire, possess, purchase, use or release a NIS into the State of
Florida shall, at the applicant's own cost, provide the NISAB with the
necessary information sufficient to determine the classification of the NIS
under assessment. The informational requirements for assessment will be
included in the assessment procedure adopted by the NISAB and shall be
promulgated as a rule by the FGFFC.
(4) The NISAB will determine the reliability of the information supplied
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by the applicant regarding the NIS under assessment and require documentation from the applicant to support this determination.
(5) In the event that an applicant cannot meet the informational
requirements adopted by the NISAB for NIS assessment, NISAB will still
classify the NIS and recommend the appropriate action regarding the
applicant's request for a license, permit or both to the FGFFC.
372.38 Reassessment of Non-Indigenous Species. (1) The NISAB will conduct a reassessment of a NIS under two
conditions:
(a) significant new information on the NIS has become available,
including but not limited to any information available from research,
monitoring or use.
(b) information showing a significant change in the intended use or
quantity to be imported is brought forth.
372.39 Administrative Remedies and Public Participation. (1) The FGFFC shall enforce the proposed Florida NIS statute subject
to the provisions of Florida Administrative Act (APA), Chapter 120, Florida
Statutes.
(2) Upon completion of the NIS assessment by NISAB, and prior to the
issuance of a license, permit, or both, the FGFFC shall issue an "Intent to
Issue" a license, permit, or both, to the applicant. The applicant shall place
a public notice of the Intent to Issue in the applicant's local area newspaper
of general circulation for twenty (21) days. A person whose substantial
interests may be affected by the intended agency action may petition for an
administrative proceeding (hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57 of the
APA. Petitions shall be filed no later than 14 days of the public notice of the
Intent to Issue or receipt of the Intent to Issue, whichever occurs first.
(3) The FGFFC shall publish the Intent to Issue to license, permit, or
both, in the Florida Administrative Weekly at the beginning of the twentyone (21) day period and solicited for comment regarding the pending
issuance of an NIS license. The NISAB and FGFFC will take under
consideration the concerns of other federal and state agencies.
(4) Persons whose substantial interest may be directly affected by the
issuance, or denial, of a NIS license, permit, or both, shall first exhaust all
remedies available under the APA before seeking judicial review.
372.40 Citizens' Civil Actions. (1) The Attorney General of the State of Florida shall have standing to
enforce the provisions of the proposed Florida NIS statute.
(2) The Attorney General shall confer citizens' standing (private attorney
general) on all persons whose substantial interest may be directly affected by
a violation of this statute.
372.41 National and International Trade and Commerce. (1) The provisions of the Lacey Act restricting transport of prohibited
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state-listed species shall be enforced under this statute.
(2) The Governor of the State of Florida shall be authorized and
empowered, for and in the name of the State of Florida, to execute
agreements establishing interstate compacts with other states to limit the
incoming incidence of prohibited state-listed NIS or those NIS not permitted
under the licensing/permitting provision of this statute.
(3) The Governor shall be the official representative of the State of
Florida on any established Interstate NIS Compact Commission and shall be
authorized and empowered to appoint an assistant representative to act as
official state representative in the absence of the Governor.
(4) The APHIS, U.S. Customs and FWS shall enforce Federal and State
provisions restricting the importation of NIS. No NIS shall be imported into
the State of Florida without a NIS license and permit granted by the
authorized state agency.
(5) Under the proposed Florida NIS statute, the State of Florida shall
continue to participate in the introduction and management of NIS by
appropriate federal and state agencies.
372.42 Penalties. - The FGFFC shall adopt civil and criminal penalties
for violation of the proposed Florida NIS statute, including FGFFC rules and
regulations promulgated under this statute, consistent with, or exceeding, the
provisions of the Lacey Act.
372.43 Other Legal Remedies. - The proposed Florida NIS statute shall
not prohibit any federal, state, or local remedies including, but not limited to,
the common law remedy under nuisance.
372.44 Public Education. (1) In general, public education of the harmful effects of unauthorized
NIS introductions shall be a primary goal of the proposed Florida NIS
statute.
(2) The NISAB shall provide appropriate state agencies with educational
materials to be distributed to the public through radio, newspaper, television,
mailings, postings and the internet.
372.45 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. - The proposed Florida NIS statute
shall not exceed the extraterritorial reach of any applicable Federal Acts
including, but not limited to, the Lacey Act.
372.46 Amendments. - The Legislature shall review the proposed
Florida NIS statute for reauthorization five (5) years from date of enactment.
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